If that helps to compartment knowledge in order to further UK security, one can expect it, eventually.
Nothing is scarier to me than a distant techno landscape where knowledge in irresponsible or irrational hands can be used for unimaginable horrors. Such extreme measures as censorship of undergrad STEM education would, in such a case, seem appealing to authorities.
Encryption offers table stakes for weaponization of math. I do, however, agree in spirit with your slippery slope arg
I built an app with a REST API a long time ago, now a defunct startup. In an effort to save API calls, the front end devs requested that I add various other resources in new endpoints, often a subset of another endpoint's response fields. The API spec ended up being fairly unwieldy.
I've often thought that this would be a great use case for GQL. Seems like a good choice if your front end wants to specify exactly what data to get.
It's all broken, but a purist will go off grid and live in the woods.
Perhaps you'd find passion in pursuing a PhD (or other avenue of professional R&/D) that focuses on resolving the fundamental issues with much of software development methodology, endpoint arch, and networking.
Barring that, the MO is to devise more robust bandaids.
The proprietary and secret nature of big tech security creates a playing field of fortified castles vs. self reliant survival in the wilderness. Tail end participants such as Google's core infra security will outmatch any independent actor. And, still, both google and apple consumer endpoints seem to have fundamental security flaws, entrenched due to being built on many billions in investment over decades.
Something like CHERI may take decades to bear fruit, hopefully turning over and pruning any insecure legacy systems sooner rather than later. Telecom is an example of why this will likely never occur anytime soon, and that we may be stuck with current security paradigms for many, many decades.
The CHERI / Morello effort looks pretty serious, thanks for the pointer... (pun intended?)
I wonder if there is an equivalent in x86-land? As far as I see, this is limited to MIPS, RISC-V, and ARM architectures.
But again I'm left wondering: if this eliminates 70% of security exploits, what about the other 30%? It's great to close and lock the garage door and front door and back door, but if the windows are still unlocked, the house remains easy to rob. Still looking for that secure single-bit....
User error is still the 600 lbs gorilla. Figure out how to make tech security idiotproof. This is increasingly difficult as IT systems become more complex over time, adopted by an expanding pool of participants.
Ok and my opinion is that the article is a joke. Also you telling me that it was the pinnacle of beat machines of it's time is like apple conveying to us every time that this is their best computer yet (an even more ridiculous joke). The OP is actually titled THE BEST DRUM MACHINE OF ALL TIME. My guess is that someone quite young wrote this.
For example is this serious information to you?
The Timing
When you talk to fans of the MPC 3000, you hear them talk about “The Feel.” They will tell you that the feel of the 3000 is like no other drum machine or sampler that exists. This is due to the timing that Roger Linn built into the machine. The timing on the MPC 3000 is extremely tight and about as true as you can get. It will record exactly what you play. Essentially, it is the essense of what a “groovebox” is.
The sequencer on the MPC 3000 is second to none.
This is just false. The sequencer on it is good, but of course there are many vastly better sequencers.
Disclaimer: I've used many sequencers including the one we are discussing.
While I never investigated it personally, my understanding is that the quantization on the MPC60/3000 series was a big part of the feel. By definition, a quantized sequence is not a sample-accurate reproduction of a live MIDI perfomance.
Also, such idiosyncratic quantization is faithfully simulated in software nowadays, anyway.
Contrarily:
I challenge the notion that it is impossible to model the A/D, any DSP, and the D/A of the MPC3000 in software. While modeling non-linear response dependent on factors such as gains and impedances is not trivial, it is certainly feasible. Much of the pro audio world has moved on to plugins for their ability to reproduce the desirable aspects of analogue hardware while removing the undesirable aspects (such as noise).
A hardware sequencer/drum machine offers things that can't be modeled: tactile feel, low(er than some computers, still to this day) midi latency. Even the limitations such as a slow UI synchronously coupled to slow offline processes (which could be conceivably be modeled) affect the creative process in non-intuitive ways.
Similarly: reel to reel creates a smell that affects the vibe. Limited tape and no undo button affect the creative process as well.
DAW's are great but are essentially unlimited. This opens up horizons, but it does remove musicianship as a requirement in a recording context.
It was a great sequencer specifically for some kicks snares and hi hats. Combined with the gritty sound it had, it was very pleasing. It’s not the best sequencer. There is no best sequencer. Going from idea to completion is what matters most. I personally couldn’t stand the Zip disks anymore with it.
But that's setting the bar a bit low? There are many things that could accomplish this task extremely well (sequencing some kicks snares and hihats). The problem here for me (aside from the terrible writing) is fetishization of old and hard to obtain gear. Someone then purchases it and it collects dust because it requires more effort to use, or you don't want to devalue your investment.
I like the sound and some of records I like were produced with it.
Go into the biz of robbing banks for profit. Like in Sneakers intro but adjusted for 2022, more automated, robotic, human-decoupled.
It'll make DHS salivate when you prove that the need for high speed, AI drone defense is greater than currently is deployed.
You'd probably sell a full stack solution with a "Jolly Bank Robber Cookbook Manual 2022" to prove the risks going fwd along with successful live field tests.
Issuers of tether that is unbacked are defacto short. They thus embody your theory by design.
Is there any derivatives market in tether to allow an outsider to open/create a futures contract as a seller (thus, short) that gives them the obligation to deliver tether upon expiry?
I suspect that such matters don't work as you believe they do.
Shorting generally is done by professionals in regulated assets. Tether doesn't seem to meet that requirement. No professional will want to take on short risk in any size in an unregulated asset. Shorting, in theory, has unlimited downside risk (to negative infinity). This would actually be a factor in an unregulated market controlled by scammers, depending (in large part) on the net positions of underlying and derivatives by opposing parties.
Nothing is scarier to me than a distant techno landscape where knowledge in irresponsible or irrational hands can be used for unimaginable horrors. Such extreme measures as censorship of undergrad STEM education would, in such a case, seem appealing to authorities.
Encryption offers table stakes for weaponization of math. I do, however, agree in spirit with your slippery slope arg