TL; DR Classic international relations “theory was based on agrarian states or early industrial states. And one of the features of agrarian interstate relations was that returns to war outpaced returns to capital, which is a fancy way of saying you could get richer, faster by conquest than by development. Under those sorts of conditions, most powers were going to be, in some form, ‘revisionist’ powers because most powers would have something to gain by attacking a weaker neighbor and seizing their resources (mostly arable land and peasant farmers to be taxed)…
But, as we’ve discussed, industrialization changes all of this: the net returns to war are decreased (because industrial war is so destructive and lethal) while the returns to capital investment get much higher due to rising productivity. In the pre-industrial past, fighting a war to get productive land was many times more effective than investing in irrigation and capital improvements to your own land, assuming you won the war. But in the industrial world, fighting a war to get a factory is many, many less times more effective than just building a new factory at home, especially since the war is very likely to destroy the factory in the first place. This was not always the case! The great wealth of many countries and indeed industrialization itself was built on resources acquired through imperial expansion; now the cost of that acquisition is higher than simply buying the stuff. War is no longer a means to profit, but an emergency response to avoid otherwise certain extreme losses.
So whereas in the old system, almost every power except potentially the hegemon, had something to potentially gain by upending the stability of the system, the economics of modern production means that quite a lot of countries will have absolutely nothing to gain from a war, even a successful one. Now that dispassionate calculation has arguably been true for more than a century; the First World War was an massive exercise in proving that nothing that could be gained from a major power war would be worth the misery, slaughter and destruction of a major power war. Subsequent conflicts have reinforced this lesson again and again, yet conflicts continue to occur. Azar Gat argues in part that this is because humans are both evolved in our biology (and thus patterns of thinking and emotion) as well as our social institutions, for warfare and aggression. We have to unlearn those instincts and redesign those institutions and this process is slow and uneven.”
> the coalition isn’t bound together by American power but by common interests
We can test this theory by looking at instances where coalition members' sovereign interests conflict with Washington's interests. Who ultimately gets their way?
There was an analogous study done IIRC in the late 90s where policy interests of poor vs. rich Americans were compared. In virtually every case, the rich/powerful people got their way, despite the poor constituents having vastly more democratic power on paper. This shouldn't be surprising to anyone living in America.
I believe it's the same story for this Western nominal "coalition". The cases where Washington compromises on its interests are rare and not conceded without a fight. Did Germany really consent to its pipelines getting blown up by another coalition member? Is it really in European interests to suffer massive economic blowback from sanctions? And then Washington's interest gets rebranded "common interest" without much investigation.
The bottom line is that elite-aligned liberals (in the classical sense) like the author are blind to the machinations of power. They presume a priori that the status quo is natural, structural and broadly consented to, rather than imposed through the vast and tireless efforts of an enormous, mostly-unelected power complex (media, financial, military, intelligence) based in Washington DC.
...and that power complex is gradually collapsing, partly because of these ideological blinders which hamstring action.
Europe suffered no consequences as a result of disagreeing with the US over the Iraq War. It suffered no consequences as a result of disagreeing with the US (and other European country's) concerns over Russian imperialism. It continues to suffer no consequences as a result of disagreeing with the US over China. Turkey suffers no consequences of its considerable disagreement from US foreign policy, despite reaching the point that it is objecting to new entries to the coalition for essentially spurious reasons.
The US does maintain a hegemony, but NATO isn't a vehicle of political compulsion, especially when you compare to the Warsaw Pact, which very much was. Recall that the Warsaw Pact's sole military operation was to invade a country that wanted out, and the Warsaw Pact itself fell apart pretty much the moment the USSR indicated it wouldn't invade countries that wanted out anymore.
I agree that NATO is not the vehicle for US world domination.
NATO is hard to understand. It is a complicated organization without a clear course and it is especially not a pure defense alliance (Afghanistan, Kosovo, Ukraine).
Some members try to push their own questionable agenda (NATO expansion to asia) and the organization has a life of its own (mission creep).
NATO's success also exacerbates the security dilemma, which its own self-righteousness cannot see.
In my opinion, NATO should limit itself to an actual pure defensive alliance.
> NATO is hard to understand. It is a complicated organization without a clear course and it is especially not a pure defense alliance (Afghanistan, Kosovo, Ukraine).
Is NATO actually in Ukraine attacking Russia, or is NATO helping Ukraine defend itself from Russia.
I think it’s entirely reasonable for a defensive alliance to arm a country to defend itself from an invader.
It’s literally the point of NATO, to counter Russian aggression.
> Europe suffered no consequences as a result of disagreeing with the US over the Iraq War.
They also didn't prevent it, so I'm not sure what your point is here: Washington got their way. It was Europe that was burdened with millions of refugees created by Washington's unprovoked invasion of Iraq (then Libya, then Syria).
> It suffered no consequences as a result of disagreeing with the US (and other European country's) concerns over Russian imperialism.
This doesn't make any sense. Europe's economy is in dire straits, and Washington continues to get exactly what it wants.
> It continues to suffer no consequences as a result of disagreeing with the US over China.
> It was Europe that was burdened with millions of refugees created by Washington's unprovoked invasion of Iraq (then Libya, then Syria).
You are aware that intervention in Libya was driven by France and UK far more than the US, right? In fact, part of the goal of the intervention in Libya was to demonstrate that Europe didn't need to rely on the US to tackle security concerns in its immediate backward--even if that demonstration was a failure.
Yes, I am aware of that, and that it doesn't affect my argument. Washington was still a huge fan of and participant in that brutal unprovoked invasion that saw slave markets return to Libya.
Washington did lead the unprovoked illegal invasions of Iraq and Syria, which had more of an impact on the refugee crisis.
So again: where are the examples of coalition members getting their way in spite of Washington's interests?
Those sanctions have been introduced by Europe itself, not the U.S.
America had nothing at all to do with it: it's not threatened by war in Ukraine in any way.
Of course, sanctions always hurt both sides. If they did not hurt Europe itself, there won't be any need to introduce them-it means that if say, energy trade was unprofitable, it won't be happening. There are no sanctions that hurt only one side because when they are, they are simply not needed as actions that are to be prohibited, don't happen anyway.
And we got out of it only in a few months, unharmed, things basically got back to normal in 2 quarters.
The article talks about this - about how the US benefits from being the "Team Captain" of this coalition. The US generally gets what it wants, or at least gets preferential treatment. The article talks about the fact that most of the institutions in the coalition (e.g. IMF, NATO) were created by the US and slanted towards the priorities of the US.
The article also doesn't claim that the US isn't using it's influence (media, financial, military) to enforce its hegemony. It argues that these actions are actually detrimental to continuing US hegemony, and that the real reason this "coalition" hangs together is because all the members have a common interest in maintaining the status quo. The article talks about the fact that if the US were to press too hard on it's hegemony, the other members of the coalition would turn against it and choose a new "team captain". The article completely acknowledges the fact that most of the members aren't huge fans of the US, for example they don't participate in the russia sanctions, but it points out that they also aren't trying to bust the sanctions. If all these other countries were trying to get out from under the thumb of the US, you'd see them taking this opportunity to align with russia and china to form a "containment coalition", but this hasn't happened (yet)
Is it really helping Europeans not get conquered in a bloody war to expend virtually all of their materiel on a US lead proxy war intended to bring about regime change in Russia?
> Is it really helping Europeans not get conquered in a bloody war to expend virtually all of their materiel on a US lead proxy war intended to bring about regime change in Russia?
The purpose of Western support for Ukraine isn't to bring about regime change in Russia, its to arrest the long pattern of Russian aggression against its neighbors with (and by turning back) the invasion of Ukraine. It follows on the failure of the accommodationist approach to preventing Russian aggression by going along, in 2008, with Russia’s request not to give Georgia and Ukraine NATO Membership Action Plan onramps, which Russia responded to by immediately invading Georgia, and, having established a friendly puppet regime in Ukraine in the interim, turning around and invading Ukraine the instant the local population displaced that puppet regime.
Also, calling the Ukrainian defensive effort “a US-led proxy war” is the dumbest statement in the universe if stated for any purpose other than sigalling fidelity to Kremlin and its not-even-trying-to-credible propaganda.
Regime change is inevitable. It’s just whether it happens before or after Putin dies, and how much chaos occurs then. I don’t think Putin has laid out a succession plan, and no o e dares try to appear like they could fill his shoes, as is the case of every other dictator.
Best case is Russia doesn’t devolve into a bloody civil war.
> I don’t think Putin has laid out a succession plan
Technically, he (or, at least, the Russian Federation) has, in that the Russian Federation has, on paper, a representative-democratic Constitution which handles succession to the office of the President (the Prime Minister succeeds).
In reality, of course, the real lines of power in the RF have little to do with the formal constitutional order of government (heck, Putin hasn’t even been President the whole time he has been in charge), but with application of influence at the time of the decision, so what has been “laid out” (either Constitutionally or, if Putin indicated a preference outside of that in advance for his successor) makes very little difference. What will matter is the actual positions of influence at the time a successor is called for.
> Best case is Russia doesn’t devolve into a bloody civil war.
That’s a feature of the best case; but it may also be a feature of the worst case. Bloody internal disorder isn’t the worst thing that has happened as a result with dissatisfaction with the existing government and conditions in a major world power.
Yes. Given the regrettable failure of Wandel durch Handel, Russia would have attacked sooner or later. As it is, expending mostly obsolete European materiel in a trade for Russian materiel at an extremely favorable ratio, in the course of a war fought off NATO soil with a reduced risk of nuclear escalation, is about the best possible scenario.
> Oryx is willing to add any losses to any list as long as they aren't already there.
Admittedly I only spent about ten minutes looking, but I was unable to find any documentation of any Ukrainian losses at all on their website.
> I have seen no sources that indicates Oryx is CIA adjacent?.
They're founded by Bellingcat alumni, which in turn is made up of CIA alumni. That's not saying either is a "CIA front" (while the CIA does have fronts, I certainly don't know what they are), but rather that they are definitely part of the extended family of the US "Intelligence Community."
> They're founded by Bellingcat alumni, which in turn is made up of CIA alumni. That's not saying either is a "CIA front" (while the CIA does have fronts, I certainly don't know what they are), but rather that they are definitely part of the extended family of the US "Intelligence Community."
If they are a part of the US "Intelligence Community" they are surely getting a raw deal as they are stopping the work because it never led to a job.
You've got it backwards. Russia started this war by first conquering a piece of territory by conquest 9 years ago and then continuing now. And it's actually Putin who used this war and conflict with the west to change the regime in Russia from quasi-democracy to dictatorship already: he used it to bolster public support 9 years ago, rode that wave to elections, re-wrote constitution allowing him to stay in power and used the war to completely crush any resemblance of internal opposition.
When I think about this kind of thing I always think about how for the first couple generations, the overwhelming majority of people who lived in the Roman Empire weren’t even aware there was an empire. They still believed that they lived in a republic.
Europe is de facto a military protectorate of the USA. They are imperial clients in all but name. And they know it. We see this overt control (not influence!) from time to time, for example how for some reason US policy makers control ASML’s exports.
Most of Europe wants more US military protection, while the US would prefer to wind it down and Europe to contribute more. Whether you're Germany, Italy, or Spain, with severe deficiency in the NATO ask of 2% GDP to defense, or Poland who contributes far more than their required share and still prefers more US defense. Lest we not forget that 5 years ago, the US moved significant troops from Germany to Poland, because of Germany's continued unwillingness to spend on their defense. This caused uproar in Germany and applause in Poland.
> for the first couple generations, the overwhelming majority of people who lived in the Roman Empire weren’t even aware there was an empire
Source? Even at the peak of the Republic, Rome was an imperial power: economic gains came principally from new conquests. Caesar had to enact land reforms in part because the Romans were half crap at maintaining the agricultural productivity of the Italian peninsula.
> Europe is de facto a military protectorate of the USA. They are imperial clients in all but name
The article provides evidence directly undermining this claim.
Don't forget that the rules of Roman Republic required the assembly to vote to declare war, without any "special military action" escape clause. Which the assembly did basically every single year for a few centuries.
I think Mr. Devereaux is mostly right from a german point of view.
(West) Germany became rich and free because of the USA.
But there were and are considerable differences of interest, for example with regard to Russia policy.
The U.S. was not happy about Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik. (1)
Many Germans were not happy about nuclear armament in Europe (limited nuclear war in Europe) (2).
The Nord Stream pipelines are a story of their own.
Mr. Devereaux is right, however, about the current German stance in the Ukraine war.
(1) https://www.jstor.org/stable/23032805 (The Nixon Administration and Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik")
(2) https://www.britannica.com/topic/limited-nuclear-options