It's also only a hypothetical that implementing an "Internet killswitch" or government-mandated ISP website blocking ("for the children" of course) will impact our freedom.
The idea is that with the infrastructure in place, we're ever closer to being impacted.
Sure. I was riffing on the other poster calling the malware prevented by a secure boot scheme a hypothetical.
It's certainly a hairy issue. The ability to run a verified software stack is a real benefit to users. Central control of that verification is bad for users, but a shadow of that central control is the obvious way to make it easy for users that don't know they should care.
In context, I called it a hypothetical because I'd asked for specific examples of boot-time malware that justify the rush to secure boot. This wasn't one.
My point is that you are anticipating problems with secure boot (there is no evidence that it will worsen the situation on general purpose hardware; there are certainly reasons to believe it might) and then dismissing some of the justification because it merely anticipates an attack.
The idea is that with the infrastructure in place, we're ever closer to being impacted.