The article says that AWS's Cedar authorization policy engine is written in Lean, but it's actually written in Dafny. Writing Dafny is a lot closer to writing "normal" code rather than the proofs you see in Lean. As a non-mathematician I gave up pretty early in the Lean tutorial, while in a recent prototype I learned enough Dafny to be semi-confident in reviewing Claude's Dafny code in about half a day.
The Dafny code formed a security kernel at the core of a service, enforcing invariants like that an audit log must always be written to prior to a mutating operation being performed. Of course I still had bugs, usually from specification problems (poor spec / design) or Claude not taking the proof far enough (proving only for one of a number of related types, which could also have been a specification problem on my part).
In the end I realized I'm writing a bunch of I/O bound glue code and plain 'ol test driven development was fine enough for my threat model. I can review Python code more quickly and accurately than Dafny (or the Go code it eventually had to link to), so I'm back to optimizing for humans again...
Looks like LLMs also find Dafny easier to write than Lean. This study, “A benchmark for vericoding: formally verified program synthesis”, reports:
> We present and test the largest benchmark for vericoding, LLM-generation of formally verified code from formal specifications … We find vericoding success rates of 27% in Lean, 44% in Verus/Rust and 82% in Dafny using off-the-shelf LLMs.
Not surprising, as Dafny is a bit less expressive (refinement instead of dependent types) and therefore easier to write. IMHO, it hits a very nice sweet spot. The disadvantage of Dafny is the lack of manual tactics to prove things when SAT/SMT automation fails. But this is getting fixed.
There's multiple Lean tutorials, some of which are more mathy than others. One of the things I like about Lean is precisely that it's an ordinary, Haskell-style functional programming language in addition to having all the Curry-Howard-isomorphism-based mathematical proof machinery. You can write `cat` in Lean.
The Dafny code formed a security kernel at the core of a service, enforcing invariants like that an audit log must always be written to prior to a mutating operation being performed. Of course I still had bugs, usually from specification problems (poor spec / design) or Claude not taking the proof far enough (proving only for one of a number of related types, which could also have been a specification problem on my part).
In the end I realized I'm writing a bunch of I/O bound glue code and plain 'ol test driven development was fine enough for my threat model. I can review Python code more quickly and accurately than Dafny (or the Go code it eventually had to link to), so I'm back to optimizing for humans again...