@Jemaclus I'm not sure why you assumed that I did not read the article. Maybe you disagreed with my conclusion and assumed I had not read the article?
To your question, I would ask: Where, exactly, does the author "address this"? (Maybe we are talking about different meaning of "this"? I explain the fallacy I'm talking about in a longer comment on a sister thread (by "sister" I mean up one level, over one, down one).
Did you mean this part?
> It turns out, we weren’t supposed to be reasoning ‘there are 3 categories of possible relationships, so we start with 33%’, but rather: ‘there is only one explanation “A causes B”, only one explanation “B causes A”, but there are many explanations of the form “C1 causes A and B”, “C2 causes A and B”, “C3 causes A and B”…’, and the more nodes in a field’s true causal networks (psychology or biology vs physics, say), the bigger this last category will be.
This is also fallacious, in my opinion. See my longer comment. In short, if you "count up" categories in this way, you are assuming information that you don't have; doing so is a matter of belief, not analysis.
Or did you mean this part?
> they might not be reasoning in a causal-net framework at all, but starting from the naive 33% base-rate you get when you treat all 3 kinds of causal relationships equally.
> This could be shown by eliciting estimates and seeing whether the estimates tend to look like base rates of 33% and modifications thereof.
This chunk of text does not debunk the claim that a 33% base rate is reasonable as a starting point. My point is that the 33% starting point was not reasonable in the first place.
To your question, I would ask: Where, exactly, does the author "address this"? (Maybe we are talking about different meaning of "this"? I explain the fallacy I'm talking about in a longer comment on a sister thread (by "sister" I mean up one level, over one, down one).
Did you mean this part?
> It turns out, we weren’t supposed to be reasoning ‘there are 3 categories of possible relationships, so we start with 33%’, but rather: ‘there is only one explanation “A causes B”, only one explanation “B causes A”, but there are many explanations of the form “C1 causes A and B”, “C2 causes A and B”, “C3 causes A and B”…’, and the more nodes in a field’s true causal networks (psychology or biology vs physics, say), the bigger this last category will be.
This is also fallacious, in my opinion. See my longer comment. In short, if you "count up" categories in this way, you are assuming information that you don't have; doing so is a matter of belief, not analysis.
Or did you mean this part?
> they might not be reasoning in a causal-net framework at all, but starting from the naive 33% base-rate you get when you treat all 3 kinds of causal relationships equally. > This could be shown by eliciting estimates and seeing whether the estimates tend to look like base rates of 33% and modifications thereof.
This chunk of text does not debunk the claim that a 33% base rate is reasonable as a starting point. My point is that the 33% starting point was not reasonable in the first place.